Abstract-In recent years, there has been a tremendous increase in the usage of IT based systems in vehicles, with predictions that in the near future, more than 90% of innovations in the automotive sector will be centered on IT software and hardware. However, innovation also means that intellectual property (IP) is created, which is valuable to third (potentially) untrusted and malicious parties. In particular, automobiles are already suffering from security issues, such as illegal copying of software IP, counterfeiting of electronic components, illegal tampering with digital data inside the electronic control units (ECUs), etc. Recently, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) attracted significant interest for numerous applications such as protection of software and hardware IP, secure key storage and component identification, to name a few. In this paper, we describe how PUFs can be used for secure key storage, component identification, IP protection in vehicle applications, and their suitability for vehicle insurance applications.
I. INTRODUCTION Today we are used to observing improvements in processors every 18 months, 50% price decreases in less than a year periods, and new technological innovations every day of our lives. As expected, every aspect of our lives is subject to this fast moving and changing society, including the automobile. Today's automobiles are complex systems including over 70 processors and over hundred megabytes of program code [1] . Tomorrow's automobiles will include connection to the Internet, real-time road condition information, and many other innovations that we can not yet imagine. However, it is our belief that many of these innovations will only be successful if integrated into a framework which takes into account both security and safety concerns. In fact, it is already clear that counterfeiting of parts destined for automobiles and planes is a lucrative business as well as a dangerous one for the end consumer [2] .
Thus, it is no surprise that a lot of work has gone into developing solutions to prevent security breaks in automobile systems [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . Moreover, and as a result of the need for security, future automobile applications will make use of standard cryptographic primitives and security solutions. Observe that a widely accepted security principle is that of basing the overall security of the system on the secrecy of the key. Thus, protecting keys from compromise seems of the utmost importance. In this paper, we suggest that a cheap, secure and efficient manner to achieve the above goal is via Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We show in this paper that PUFs can be used as unclonable identifiers as well as in combination with private-key and public-key primitives to safeguard intellectual property (IP) destined for the automobile. In addition, we suggest that PUFs can be advantageous for insurance purposes. Remark. In our discussion of physical unclonable functions and their use in anti-counterfeiting applications we will assume familiarity with standard cryptographic blocks such as symmetric-key primitives (e.g. the AES, DES, triple-DES), hash functions (e.g. MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2) and public-key based primitives (RSA, elliptic curves). For an introduction to standard crypto primitives in the context of automotive security we refer for example to [1] . We will also make use of (and assume familiarity with) error correcting codes 1 and universal hash functions 2 .
II. PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
In 2001, Pappu et al. [10] , [11] introduced the concept of Physical Random Functions or Physical Unclonable Functions. Physical Unclonable Functions consist of inherently unclonable physical systems. When a stimulus is applied to the system, it reacts with a response. Such a pair of a stimulus C i and a response R i is called a challenge-response pair (CRP). Thus, we write: R i ← PUF(C i ). PUFs have essentially two parts: i) a physical part and ii) an operational part. The physical part is a physical system that is very difficult to clone. It inherits its unclonability from uncontrollable process variations during manufacturing. In the case of PUFs on an IC such process variations are typically deep-submicron variations such as doping variations in transistors. The operational part corresponds to a circuit design to take care of the noise present in PUF responses as well as their non-uniform nature. 1 We write an [n, k, d]-code to mean a binary code C of length n, cardinality 2 k (encoding messages of length k), and minimum distance d. A linear code with minimum distance d has error correcting capability or error correcting
. We assume also the existence of efficient encoding and decoding algorithms for the specific block code chosen. 2 A universal hash function, introduced by Carter and Wegman in [8] , is a map from a finite set A of size a to a finite set B of size b. For a given hash function h and two strings x, x with x = x , we define the function δ h (x, x ) as equal to 1 if h(x) = h(x ) and 0 otherwise. For a finite set (or family) of hash functions H, δ H (x, x ) is defined to be h∈H δ h (x, x ). For a random h ∈ H and any two distinct x, x , the probability that h(x) = h(x ) is δ H (x, x )/|H|, where |H| denotes the size of the set H. There has been extensive research on universal hash functions (see for example [9] ).
Examples of PUFs include optical PUFs [10] , silicon PUFs [12] and coating PUFs [13] . In [14] the notion of an Intrinsic PUF or IPUF (a PUF inherently present in a device) was introduced targeting FPGAs.
Previous works [10] , [12] , [13] , [15] , [14] have either explicitly or implicitly made the following security assumptions: (i) a response R i (to a challenge C i ) gives only a small amount of information on another response R j (to a different challenge C j ) with i = j and (ii) without the corresponding PUF (i.e. the actual physical device or structure) at hand, it is impossible to come up with the response R i corresponding to a challenge C i , except with negligible probability. In most cases, it is also reasonable to assume that PUFs are tamper evident and that the PUF response is only available inside the device after the enrollment procedure [15] , [14] . We make these assumptions in this paper.
III. HELPER DATA ALGORITHMS As a result of the noisy nature of PUF responses a Fuzzy Extractor or Helper Data algorithm is required to extract secure keys from them. For formal definitions of Fuzzy Extractors and Helper Data algorithms we refer to [16] , [17] . Informally, we need to implement two basic primitives: (i) Information Reconciliation or error correction and (ii) Privacy Amplification or randomness extraction. In order to implement those two primitives, helper data W are generated during the enrollment phase and procedures Gen and Rep are run. In order to implement the procedures Gen and Rep an error correction code C and a set H of universal hash functions [8] is required. The Gen-procedure takes as input a PUF response(s) R and produces as output a key K and helper data W = (W 1 , W 2 ). This is achieved as follows. First, a code word C S ← C is chosen at random from C. Then, a first helper data vector equal to W 1 = C S ⊕ R is generated. Furthermore, a hash function h i is chosen at random from H and the key K is defined as K ← h i (R). The helper data W 2 is set to i. During the key reconstruction phase the procedure Rep is run. It takes as input a noisy response R from the same PUF and helper data W and reconstructs the key K i.e. K ← Rep(R , W ). This is accomplished according to the following steps: (1) Information Reconciliation: Using the helper data W 1 , W 1 ⊕R is computed. Then, the decoding algorithm of C is used to obtain C S . From C S , R is reconstructed as R = W 1 ⊕ C S ; and (2) Privacy amplification: The helper data W 2 is used to choose the correct hash function h i ∈ H and to reconstruct the key as K = h i (R). Notice that we have implicitly assumed the use of a binary code.
IV. SECURITY FOR IN-VEHICLE SYSTEMS
In this section we provide an overview of current solutions, attacker models and typical threats for in-vehicle systems. We base our discussion heavily on [1] , which provides a recent state-of-the-art survey of these issues.
A. Assumptions, Attackers, and Constraints
Wolf et al. [1] divide attackers in the automotive domain into four categories according to their targets as: [18] ) looking at applications enabled by car-to-car communications and intelligent infrastructure. Clearly, an infrastructure relaying safety, location, and other security critical information will potentially be the target of attacks for personal gain.
Based on their threat analysis against vehicle systems, Wolf et al. [1] identified the following overall security objectives: 1) Data confidentiality: unauthorized access to data considered confidential should be infeasible. 2) Data integrity: unauthorized data modification should be infeasible and when feasible, it should be detectable.
3) Hardware (HW) and software (SW) component integrity:
unauthorized modifications to vehicular HW and SW components should be infeasible or at least detectable by the vehicle. 4) Service and data availability: authorized HW and SW components should be granted access to data and services. 5) Uniqueness: hardware components should be infeasible to clone. If a cloning attempt is performed it should be detected and appropriate measures taken.
A defining characteristic of automotive systems is that attackers usually have full physical access to the system and thus have much more freedom to attack the system. In addition to the added adversarial abilities that automotive systems must be able to withstand, their resources are rather limited in terms of processing power, memory, etc. Finally, vehicular systems must be able to work under extreme environmental conditions and for long periods of time (over 20 years), they have very limited connectivity to the outside world (for example, it seems unlikely that you will be able to connect to an on-line server to receive frequent software or cryptographic material updates), the functionality of the vehicle should work properly even if external communications are severely limited and infrequent, and from a user interaction point of view, nearly all vehicular applications are required to run almost completely autonomously. We end this section by noticing that most security solutions in automotive systems assume the existence of a security module (SM) (also called in [1] security anchor) which provides security relevant functionality such as encryption, decryption, signature generation and verification, hash computation, and secret-key storage. It is important to point out that such SM must satisfy certain security requirements. In particular, it should be unclonable, it must be able to be used for secure key storage applications, it must be able to perform cryptographic operations in an efficient manner and without leaking secret information, and it must be able to raise an alarm in case of a security breach [1] . We observe that PUFs thus seem well suited for use inside the SM thanks to their unclonability and tamper evidence properties. We will elaborate on how to use PUFs for automotive applications in Sect. V. In the following, we review existing published security solutions for automotive applications.
B. Existing Schemes
In recent years, numerous articles have appeared focusing on embedded security in vehicles. Work has focused on the areas of component identification [3] , [6] , vehicular software protection [4] , [7] , and on secure in-vehicle communications [5] . We observe that the types of attacks performed on vehicle systems have also changed over time. In [7] , Scheibel et al. propose an architecture for vehicular SW protection, in which software is bound to a certain vehicle hardware and software configurations. This guarantees that a content provider's content is only accessible to previously authorized vehicles with the appropriate secret keys (used for decryption of the content) The proposed architecture is based on virtualization technology, trusted computing functionality, and on an interoperable legacy operating system. Adelsbach et al. [4] , proposed a protocol for the secure distribution and installation of the SW in an embedded system using publickey broadcast encryption and trustworthy computing to bind the SW to the specific embedded system. Wolf et al. [5] emphasized the importance of secure communication inside the vehicle as an enabler of future services in the automotive industry and proposed several solutions to various vehicular bus security problems such as authentication, secrecy, etc., based on current modern cryptographic techniques. Bogdanov et al. [6] present a survey of various architectural security solutions for the automotive applications based upon hardware modules such as a customized security controller, trusted platform modules (TPMs), security boxes, FPGAs and ASICs. In [3] , a vehicle component identification scheme is proposed in order to prevent the illegal manipulation, counterfeiting, and exchange of devices. Such component identification can be used then as a basis for future innovative technologies such as electronic license plates, provided that each vehicle has a unique digital identifier. The proposed protocol is based on a central hardware security module (HSM), which is considered to be a tamper proof microcontroller or a TPM. To identify a component, a passive RFID transponder (with the capability of performing symmetric cryptography) is used. This RFID tag is attached to each security or safety critical component in such a way that removing the tag destroys the component. This can be seen equivalent to the device's ID being unclonable. Each component holds certificate consisting of (P K C , ID C ) and it has a private key sk C , where P K C is the public key corresponding to the private key sk C , while ID C is the component's unique identifier. The HSM, imprinted with a secret key K V , holds a list of all the vehicle components, referred to as UL. UL is considered to be securely synchronized regularly with a global list (GL) of all components. The HSM checks the new component certificate on the installment. On provision of the correct certificate and if it is not on the GL for another vehicle, the secret key K V is shared with the component. In the proposed protocol it is assumed that the components knowing the secret key K V are trustworthy and play fair, i.e. they don't compromise the system. The component identification scheme defines three stages during the life-cycle of a component: (i) initialization, (ii) running system, and (iii) component demounting.
V. APPLICATIONS OF PUFS AND HELPER DATA ALGORITHMS IN VEHICULAR SECURITY

A. Secure Key Storage and Component Identification
A key observation in [13] is that the coating can be used to store keys (rather than as a challenge-response repository as in previous works) and that these keys are not stored in memory. Rather, whenever an application requires the key, the key is generated on the fly. This makes it much more difficult for an attacker to compromise key material in security applications. Tuyls et al. [13] also show that active attacks on the coating can be easily detected, thus, making it a good countermeasure against probing attacks. Observe that the use of PUFs as key storage mechanisms is not limited to coating PUFs. In particular, a key property of the helper data algorithm is that given only the helper data or the PUF response, the key can not be derived. In addition, no information can be derived from the public helper data. Thus, making either the PUF response or the helper data inaccessible to an attacker allows for secure key storage. This implies that intrinsicPUFs in the sense of [14] could be highly suitable as SRAM memory is present in many (if not all) embedded processors. An additional advantage of such SRAM-based PUF is that there are not additional manufacturing steps or modifications necessary as SRAM memory is a standard building block of most embedded systems. Summarizing, secret-key storage with PUFs has several advantages including:
• The secret-key is not available in memory except for a small period of time (when used as input to a encryption/decryption/signature algorithm). This also means that if an attacker opens up the chip where the PUF is contained, it is unlikely that he will be able to obtain much information leading to the recovery of the key.
• Because of the tamper-evidence property of many PUFs, opening a chip to actively and invasively attack it, will most likely result in changes to the physical structure defining the PUF. Thus, an invasive attack will likely result in the key value changing, making it impossible to perform any cryptographic operation involving the original key.
• Traditionally, the previous two properties are associated with expensive hardware components. In contrast, PUFs offer this functionality at low cost since it involves semiconductor components which are standard in the building of embedded processors, ICs, and FPGAs.
Observe that a PUF can also be used as an unclonable identifier. In what follows, we show that using a PUF in the system proposed in [3] can result in simplifications of the complexity of the overall system. Weimerskirch et al. [3] proposed to attach an RFID tag to each security or safety critical component in a vehicle for identification purposes. In addition and as mentioned in Sect. IV-B, each component has both a public and associated private key pair. Notice that the scheme of [3] is based on proving knowledge of secret keys (resp. private keys) using Message Authentication Codes (MACs) (resp. signature schemes). PUFs can be used in two complementary manners. First, a PUF can be used to derive an unclonable identifier ID. This has the advantage that the identifier information is present intrinsically in the component and no additional RFID tag needs to be added. Second, the private-public key pair can be derived from a PUF as follows. We assume that the system parameters are available in nonvolatile memory of the component in question. For illustration purposes, we consider a system based on elliptic curves. By system parameters, we mean for example, the coefficients of an elliptic curve, a point P of large order and the order of the subgroup generated by P . Then, a component containing a PUF can be such that it derives a string inside the component and sets this string equal to the private key sk C of the component, the device stores the corresponding helper data in non-volatile memory, computes the corresponding public key P K C = sk C · P , and publishes the public key in a certificate also stored in non-volatile memory. Such a system has the advantage that the private key of the component is only known by the device and never known outside of it.
B. IP Protection
Looking at the uses of software in current and future vehicle systems, we can observe two types of IP: 1) IP aimed at determining the functionality of the vehicle system. For example, automobile manufacturers deploy the same hardware (motor) but define the level of performance for a specific model in SW, charging more for automobiles with additional horse power. It is clear that an attacker would be interested in buying a cheaper car model and upgrading the SW to obtain the performance of a more expensive model. 2) Third party IP. For example, vehicle navigation systems,
and more generally what is termed infotainment in [1] . Services desired on the IP provider side include: timelimited utilization, quantity-limited utilization, devicebound utilization, usage metered utilization, subscription services. A key property desired in both cases is the ability to limit the number of platforms on which the SW (regardless of its use) is running. In the next we show how PUFs can be used to this end. The protocol shown here is based on the protocols used for IP protection on FPGAs presented in [14] . We limit our exposition to the symmetric-key case but public-key based protocols are equally possible [15] . We observe that the only changes in the protocol of [14] are in the parties involved. In particular, in our scenario, we talk about the end-user (USR) as opposed to an IP integrator. IP-provider (IPP), the component's hardware manufacturer (HWM) and the trusted third party (TTP) are available in both cases. We have also included the actual device (DEV) as a party involved in an exchange with the user when the system is offline. Figure 1 shows the protocol adapted to the automobile setting. The basic idea in . As explained in [14] , the MAC (Message Authentication Code) is necessary to authenticate the origin of the IP, since encryption does not provide sufficient authentication guarantees. We emphasized with the offline authentication step that the last step is performed without access to an on-line TTP.
C. PUFs as Seals for Insurance Applications
Aftermarket body parts sold to the collision repair industry is a lucrative market for both car manufacturers and independent part manufacturers. In [19] , Frost & Sullivan reports that the number of reported collisions has been on the rise, ranging between 9 million and 13 million annually. They also estimate that the number of unreported collisions is climbing every year and it could represent an additional seven million to eight million annually. Independently manufactured aftermarket parts tend to be of lower cost in the range 15% to 45% below original equipment (OE) component prices. This is often due to the lower quality of parts and processes used to manufacture the components. This is especially a lucrative market since some consumers would rather not report an accident to the insurance agency due to increased premiums and instead get it repaired themselves with cheap parts. This leads to big safety concerns for all road users and additional costs when such cars are involved in accidents. We propose a new system in which insurance agencies can hold consumers responsible for not reporting accidents and give more incentives to the ones which use reliable parts when involved in an accident. This involves building upon an existing system which is used to certify parts and to add a PUF based solution to prove the use of such parts after an accident.
One such system to certify parts is the Certified Automotive Parts Association (CAPA), a non-profit organization created in 1987. After rigorous testing, CAPA certifies that a particular part meets CAPA's recognized quality standards. The manufacturer is then authorized to place CAPA's certification mark on the external body of the certified part. CAPA claims that once its seal is affixed to a surface, it will self-destruct when removed. This ensures that a seal cannot be transferred from a certified part to a non-certified part. This is an open system which includes both independent and OE manufactures. CAPA has also set up a tracing system using a unique serial number on its seals which can be used by anyone (not just repair shop or insurance companies) on-line. However, it is not cradle-tograve tracing as the CAPA servers do not store any information on when and where the parts have been used. Misuse such as illicit placing of such a seal on a non-certified part is prevented only by legal means. This creates a big loop-hole for counterfeit manufacturers who can easily access the public database to create seals with appropriate numbering. The lack of cradle-to-grave tracing also prevents the insurance agencies to accurately judge if a part was used on a car before or after an accident.
Our solution involves first adding a PUF based seal to make the identifier unclonable by non-certified parties and counterfeiters. The vehicle system is similar to the one suggested in [3] in which a central HSM identifies and holds the status of all components attached to the system. The HSM's main goal is to store a status image of the components attached to the car at different time intervals. After an accident, the insurance agency can irrefutably determine the components that were attached during an accident based on the certified copy of the tamper resistant HSM.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows how PUFs can be used to solve various vehicle system security problems. We showed how PUFbased secret-key storage can be used to enhance and simplify existing solutions and how their inherent unclonability allows for elegant anti-counterfeiting solutions. We also show how to bind software to a device containing a PUF identifier, thus resulting in a secure IP protection system. Finally, we discuss a novel application of PUFs as seals for insurance agencies to determine the quality of parts used on a vehicle during an accident in an irrefutable way.
